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The Zefra Scenario


The Catastrophe Developing in Zefra

The troubled nation of Zefra needs your help!

Historical Background

The island of Capricornia lies in the South Pacific in the Coral Sea. In topography and climate it seems like an idyllic South Seas paradise, but dig deeper and discover its challenges.

There are two independent nations that share this island: Daloon in the south and Zefra in the north. The two are of about the same size and share a common border that runs roughly east to west through the middle of Capricornia.

Map of Capricornia The two nations also share a dependence upon Capricornia’s scarce fresh water resources; these are located in the border region between the two nations. Some recent new finds of underground water reserves could potentially alleviate the scarcity to some extent, but, being in the border region, these new finds also have potential for greater antagonism between the two nations. Both nations do have desalination plants that can provide for some of their fresh-water needs, but these require considerable energy for their operation. So, water availability remains a critical issue in both nations and a source of ongoing friction between them.

Both Daloon and Zefra historically were relatively impoverished nations with very little in terms of useful natural resources or major economic activity. Certainly the coal reserves that were found in Zefra in the 20th century suggested its economy would improve, but these went largely undeveloped until recently. Australia, formerly Zefra's largest trading partner had its own huge coal reserves, so had little need of the coal that Zefra wanted to export. More recently, however, with the enormous growth of the Chinese economy, China has replaced Australia as Zefra's biggest trading partner, and has made aggressive moves to exploit Zefra's coal reserves to support Chinese industrial expansion.

In addition, there have been recent new finds of substantial natural energy resources, with both nations seeking to exploit them. Most of these new finds have been in the form of offshore natural gas along Daloon's eastern coastline. As with Zefra's coal resources, it is the Chinese who are making big moves to secure these resources to increase its national industrial strength.

Politically, Zefra and Daloon have very different histories and circumstances. Daloon was formerly a Spanish colony which gained its independence in 1947. In the early years of independence it enjoyed relative political stability, although the apparent lack of natural resources meant that it faced significant economic challenges. However, Daloon benefits from a relatively homogeneous and stable population. Following independence, Daloon maintained defence treaties with Spain and good relationships with other major powers. Daloon’s major security concern developed from sharing the island of Capricornia with Zefra.

Zefra’s history unfolded quite differently to that of Daloon. In the early years of Zefran independence, insurgency and internal strife were all too common. During this period, Daloon maintained a policy of trying not to antagonize Zefra; however, in the early years of the 21st century Daloon was faced with circumstances that forced a reconsideration of this policy of avoidance.

Zefra historically was a French Colony that gained its independence in 1951. One legacy of the French colonial administration was that it produced a well-educated middle class from the Bongo minority population. Bongo tribes had arrived in Zefra long before the French in the 17th century. They were primarily merchants and initially established a good relationship with the Truscans, an indigenous people who were already well established in the area that became Zefra.

In 1822 the French arrived to colonize Zefra. Under French colonial administration, many Bongos were absorbed into the government's administrative machine and thus gained stature as functionaries of the colonial power. Partly thanks to their cultural emphasis on mercantile activity, they easily transformed into an entrepreneurial middle class. As for the Truscans, the French largely marginalized them; they were viewed as uneducated with little or no motivation to better themselves. Apart from the majority who continued with their hunter-gather traditions, a few Truscans were able to get menial jobs, such as caring for French families and property, or labouring on French plantations. But the French rarely offered positions of responsibility to Truscans. This disenfranchisement led to a number of Truscan uprisings through the colonial period.

Since independence in 1951, the Bongo population has dominated the national government and led economic development, albeit often with whiffs of cronyism and corruption. With the French model as its ideal, Zefra was initially formed as a republic. Over a series of elections where Truscans participated only in small numbers, Bongos eventually occupied more of the positions of political power and used this to appoint more of their fellow tribesmen to positions in the government, in the military, in the judiciary. From the early days of independence they had taken a strong lead in the business community as well, with Truscans showing little ambition to engage in such activity.

Over time, a few strong men of like minds assumed the positions of political and economic power in Zefra, and they were all ethnic Bongos. Gradually Zefra was transforming into an autocracy under Bongo control. The Bongo dominance in government, business, the civil and military services, and the judiciary further alienated the Truscan population.

For many years the Truscans feigned to ignore these developments. But they led eventually to a series of local uprisings across the country.

The Zefran Civil War, 2002-2009

Following a Bongo attempt to crush the Truscan resistance in the late 1990s, the result was the unifying many of the rebels into an opposition movement called the People's Liberation Movement (PLM). Associated with the development of the PLM, was a parallel armed component called the People's Liberation Armed Militia (PLAM).

Eventually Zefra erupted in a civil war between 2002 and 2009. In Truscan-dominated areas of Zefra, the PLM enjoyed considerable popular support. With this, the PLAM was able to establish its control over significant areas of Zefra. However, the development of factions within the PLM limited its overall effectiveness.

Internally the PLAM was dominated by three major sub-groups, each forming around its own charismatic leader. Initially these three sub-groups could generally agree over actions to be taken against the central governments. But the leaders of the three factions espoused different visions for the ultimate aim, namely some form of autonomous Truscan homeland. The internal divisiveness over ultimate aims sometimes led to uncoordinated and ineffective operations against government forces.

Reports of atrocities in the Zefran Civil War became particularly gruesome in early 2007. When cell-phone videos of these began appearing regularly in the evening news, the United States government decided that it would need to make a generous and well-intentioned attempt to settle issues in the country. A small force of Marines landed in eastern Zefra to help sort out the belligerents. However, the American initiative was starved of resources, unsurprising given that the US was then heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US initiative ended in abysmal failure, and soon after the Americans withdrew, there were atrocities where the native supporters of the Americans killed a number of their fellow countrymen, claiming they were being maligned for having collaborated with the Americans (who were seen in some quarters of Zefra as an occupying force). Animosity towards the US continued after the end of the Civil War when promises from the US to help the Zefran economy proved illusions -- during this time the US had its own economic problems to deal with. Nevertheless, the ill feeling in Zefra towards the US continues to complicate matters to this day.

Meanwhile, the civil war in Zefra caused a substantial flow of refugees across the border into Daloon. Within their numbers, the refugees harboured Truscan insurgents who had come from Zefra and found safe havens for future action on the Daloon side of the border. Daloon, at this point, had a very immature security establishment with nascent armed forces and a very lightly armed border patrol. Resources like these were insufficient for Daloon to maintain effective control of its border with Zefra, nor were they able to stop insurgents, lodged within the safe havens of the refugee camps, from conducting operations from Daloon into Zefra.

In response to incursions by the insurgents, Zefra initiated a series of cross-border counter-insurgency penetrations into Daloon to deal with the insurgents’ safe havens where the Daloon forces were seemingly impotent. Claiming the right of hot pursuit, the Zefran government of the day ignored diplomatic protests from Daloon and the international community, most notably from the European Union.

While ostensibly having the apprehending of the Zefran insurgents as their only objective, Zefra operations caused significant damage to local Daloon infrastructure and property. The levels of violence and its apparently indiscriminate application generated a substantial migration of internally displaced persons away from the border area. Many ethnic Truscans, when apprehended by Zefran forces in or near the refugee camps in the proximity of the border, were treated brutally, and there were allegations of rape, torture, and amputations by Bongo militia men who seemed barely under control of any leaders, let alone of their national government.

Over time, migrations of ethnic Truscans were generally pushing deeper into Daloon. In some respects this just spread the violence and bloodshed, as Bongo-led Zefran irregular forces probed deeper and deeper into Daloon in pursuit of Truscan refugees, although the target was claimed to be only the insurgents who were hiding among the apparently innocent refugees.

Meanwhile, within Zefra factions of PLAM were inflicting tremendous violence on seemingly peaceable Bongo neighbours in the border regions and elsewhere. PLAM spokesmen claimed that these Bongos were not what they seemed, and indeed alleged that many provided bases from which Bongo irregulars were crossing the border to attack the refugee camps in Daloon.

In the years after the Zefran Civil War evidence frequently emerged of mass graves on both sides of the border. Initially these were found in proximity to the refugee camps in Daloon and were associated with the Zefra operations against the mainly Truscan insurgents within the camps. However, evidence also emerged that Truscans, probably associated with the insurgency, had committed heinous crimes in areas of Zefra that they controlled. Clearly all sides of the matter had committed atrocities that showed this uncivilized and reprehensible behaviour was widespread.

By 2009 civilian casualties were rising quickly, with both Bongos and Truscans sharing responsibility for the butchery. At this point the UN High Commissioner for Refugees sought international condemnation for the atrocities on both sides, as well as commitments to separate the belligerents. Unfortunately in the early 21st century Western nations had become embroiled in military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Economically they were still feeling the impact of the recession of 2008-9. So, they were reluctant to commit precious resources to sort out yet another bloody mess.

But by mid-2009 all parties to the violence in and near Zefra had exhausted themselves. Every party seemed to see some advantage in ending hostilities. Some of the parties saw it as a chance to re-established norms of civil behaviour and to seek a more peaceful environment for their children. But others saw it simply as a chance to rearm for the next time, and to inculcate into a new generation fiery memories of the grievous harm that others had inflicted on their clans and tribes, and a burning desire for revenge on the alleged perpetrators. Timeline of Zefran History

The civil war finally ended when the UN brokered a peace agreement that created an autonomous region under PLM/PLAM control within Zefra but adjacent to its border with Daloon. This agreement is credited with creating a period of relative calm that lasted for some years.

In its own response, the government of Daloon sought to secure its borders. Several European nations provided some limited assistance to Daloon in the form of military training assistance teams and a small amount of surplus military equipment.

Within the international community, there were ongoing recriminations that too little had been done to help the people of Zefra. Thousands had died, while the Western nations had seemingly been busy with their own problems. The nations of the world pledged that the next time Zefra was in crisis, they would not again stand idly by. The next time they would do something.

Colonial Period and Religion in the Region

Religion in Zefra

Islam was introduced to Zefra by the traders arriving from Arabia, China, Indonesia, the Malayan peninsula, and India. It became firmly established in the 15th century and remains the dominant religion in the country. About half the population associates with Islam, specifically with the Sunni branch. There are very small pockets of Shia adherents, but they are very much a minority. The Shias of Zefra are usually first generation immigrants who came in the late 20th century for economic reasons and most of these live in the major urban areas.

Upon their arrival with other European settlers in the 19th century, French missionaries attempted to introduce Christianity, but encountered many obstacles. At the time, Islam was already the dominant religion and Christianity never developed a large community of adherents. Christians represent about 15% of the population.

French Catholic missionaries first arrived on Capricornia in 1822; expulsion by local tribes under their Islamic religious leaders in 1836 caused France to send a gunboat in 1838. In 1842, Zefra was declared a French protectorate, which the Catholic missionaries hoped would allow them to do their work with less opposition. However, with Islam already well established, conversions to Christianity remained rare.

Other religions are represented in Zefran society. This includes Buddhism, Hinduism, Bahá'í, and various traditional religions with a long history in South East Asia and the South Pacific.

The constitution of Zefra, crafted under French guidance with French republicanism as its ideal, confirmed Zefra as a secular country and guarantees freedom of religion. Zefrans are generally supportive of religious tolerance in their country and religion has not been a factor in the ethnic friction in the country.

Religion in Daloon

Modern Daloon is even more secular than Zefra. The first group to explore the southern part of the island of Capricornia was the expedition originally led by Ferdinand Magellan, in the service of the king of Spain. The expedition arrived in late 1521, not long after Magellan had died in the Philippines.

For most of its colonial period, Daloon developed much like the Philippines did, in that both were parts of the Spanish East Indies (Indias orientales españolas) which, in turn, was a part of the Spanish empire. Like the rest of the Spanish East Indies, Daloon was administered largely from Mexico City as the capital of the Kingdom of New Spain, until Mexican independence in 1821. As was the case for the Philippines, most of the early immigration to the southern end of Capricornia (the area now known as Daloon) came via New Spain, rather than from the Spanish homeland directly.

The first Spanish missionaries arrived in the 16th century, traveling with the early explorers. As a consequence of their earlier arrival in the area, they were more successful in making inroads among the natives than their French counterparts were in Zefra. Thus nearly 90% of the population of Daloon is Roman Catholic.

The United States annexed most of the Spanish East Indies after the Spanish American War. But Daloon was an exception. The oversight was apparently due to Capricornia being too small to be shown on the maps used in negotiating the Treaty of Paris of 1898. Most negotiators on both sides seemed completely unaware of its existence.

So Daloon remained administered by Madrid into the 20th century, as it had been since 1821 (Mexican independence). It co-existed with the Islamic sultanate in northern Capricornia (now Zefra), until the northern part became a French protectorate in 1842. Peaceful co-existence continued through most of the 20th century.

With Madrid focused on local affairs during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) and subsequently through to the end of the Second World War, bonds to the Spanish homeland atrophied significantly and the local administration in Daloon, by necessity, became stronger. Daloon was already largely functioning as an independent (and tiny) country by 1936, even though independence was not declared until 1947. A fractious issue with Madrid arose when the administration in Daloon unilaterally negotiated a leasing arrangement with the United States, Britain, and Australia in 1942 to provide bases in Daloon to oppose Japanese expansion. However, since Daloon remained beyond the outer limit of Japanese expansion, these bases played a negligible role in the war. The leasing arrangement provided an injection of funds into a moribund local economy, but also left leaders in Daloon apprehensive of future arrangements to allow foreign military forces into their country.

Religious Regional Links

The religious communities of Zefra and Daloon developed links to other nations in the region. The Muslims, particularly numerous in Zefra, had strong bonds with other Muslims in the Malayan Peninsula and the islands of Oceania. The Roman Catholics of Zefra shared the traditions of their faith especially with adherents in Daloon and the Philippines, for shared religious values. For Catholics in Daloon it was also because they were all part of the Spanish East Indies until the start of the 20th century.

The Factions Within Zefra

The Government of Zefra

Since nation-wide elections two months ago (following a failed attempt in late 2019 to invade Daloon), there is a new administration in Zefra, under a new president. The new president (inaugurated in April 2020) was formerly a rear-admiral and Chairman of the Military Council (the highest rank in the Zefran armed forces). He resigned his commission when there was an apparent overwhelming demand from his countrymen that he should enter politics and lead his nation out of its abysmal situation.

The armed forces of Zefra treat the new president as their Commander-in-Chief, and with his military credentials, he is highly respected throughout the military services and very active in this role.

Despite his claims to be running a new cleaner administration, many of the same old figures have resurfaced in positions of considerable authority. In response to criticism in this respect, the President claims that he has a only small pool of qualified experts to draw from, and the nation needs leaders who have leadership experience and can get the job done. The fact is that many in leadership positions are members of the President's family, and many of these had leadership positions in the days of the Civil War and the violence and atrocities that followed -- if they were not complicit in these incidents, there is little evidence they tried to improve the situation.

The President has also promoted into positions of power a cadre of military friends who had been close to him throughout his career in the armed forces. Already, this new President seems to have put a finger on every possible lever of power in Zefra. While he claims his new administration will follow democratic norms, there seem to be few opportunities for dissenting voices to be heard. That said, there is no convincing evidence yet that the new president's administration has a hand in any of the recent violence.

Zefran Armed Forces

The Zefran Army

The Zefran Army was designed largely as a home-defence force. It also provides sinecures for many leaders in the Bongo community, and is also rife with cronyism and black-marketeering. The bulk of the Army is organized as one division of six brigades and some divisional troops.

A separate brigade, the Zefran Republican Guard, stands apart from the division and has favoured status within the Army. The level of training throughout the Army is low, with the exception of the Guard brigade. The Zefran Republican Guard is mechanized and capable of field operations, unlike the remainder of the Army.

Army units are generally equipped with late 20th century equipment acquired second-hand from France, Britain, and Russia. The Republican Guard has acquired some modern sensor capabilities, e.g., night-vision devices, small unmanned air vehicles, and ground-surveillance radars.

Information that is widely available indicates that there is a rogue commander from the Zefran Republican Guard with his unit in the vicinity of Kabra ( see map). This commander has positioned the battalion (known as the "Illustrious Fighters for Freedom" or IFF) astride Route A4, also known as the Capricorn Highway. Most of the troops are in the hills north and south of the highway, and west of Kabra.

In reference to the UN Coalition Force (CJTF-Z), the IFF commander has been quoted as saying: "We will turn back these foreign dogs, or leave their bones drying in the hot, hot sun."

The Zefran Navy

Zefra's navy has three coastal patrol squadrons which have at their disposal a few corvettes and fast patrol boats. Most are used in support of border protection, customs enforcement, and counter-smuggling operations.

The navy does have two relatively modern diesel-electric coastal submarines acquired from China. However their state of repair is in doubt given the cash-strapped state of the Navy.

The Navy does have a small cadre of dedicated officers and sailors and they may have developed some sort of suicidal pact to use the coastal submarines and fast patrol boats to fend off a threat of foreign troops landing on Zefran shores. Such a landing would be treated as a disgrace to the good name of the Zefran Navy, and many in the Navy will do all it may take to prevent such a landing.

The Zefran Air Force

The Air Force comprises three wings, each with a number of squadrons. No. 1 Wing has one squadron for ground attack equipped with 12 Northrop F-5E/F aircraft. There is also a utility transport squadron equipped with 12 Bell 212 (civilian Twin Huey variant) helicopters. No. 1 Wing also includes the Presidential Flight with two Learjet and two Beech Queen Air aircraft. No. 2 Wing is primarily for transport with one squadron equipped with four Transall C.160 aircraft and four de Havilland Canada DHC-5 Buffalo aircraft. A second squadron is equipped with six Bell 206 JetRanger helicopters. No. 3 Wing is assigned to the coastal patrol mission and equipped with six Beech Queen Air aircraft; these have been modified from the civilian model with the addition of maritime surveillance radars and infrared sensors.

The maintenance level of all aircraft types is in question. As for weapons for the aircraft, details are sketchy. In recent years many shipments from North Korea labeled "Farm Equipment" were delivered to Air Force weapons depots; little is know about the contents, but it seems very unlikely it was to support Zefran farmers.

Ministry of the Interior Forces

Border Guards

The Zefra-Daloon land border has traditionally been patrolled on the northern side by the Zefran Border Guards, a force of about 2600 personnel. Border Guards operate from a series of guard towers and camps along the border. They will patrol the border area with forces up to platoon strength. The Border Guards are armed with small calibre infantry weapons, with some limited indirect fire from mortars up to 120mm calibre.

From the time of the Civil War, this force had a reputation for brutality against Zefran citizens who might be suspected of trying to flee south as refugees, of course most of these were Truscans. Several atrocities during the Civil War were attributed to Border Guard patrols that came across groups who were in hiding near the border waiting for a time when they might cross safely into Daloon. Several mass graves of up to a hundred corpses have been found within 5km of the border where the dead appear to have signature wounds and mutilations long associated with Border Guard methods.

Customs Agency

This agency is approximately 800 strong. The Customs Agency controls access through maritime and air ports. In the region of the border with Daloon, the Agency's responsibilities have been taken over by the Army and the Border Guards who are much better armed.

Ministry of the Interior Gendarmerie

The Gendarmerie is approximately 15,000 strong. In demographics, it is 60% Bongo and 40% Truscan. It is largely ineffective outside of the urban areas.

Internal Security Bureau (ISB).

The ISB is 100% Bongo and fiercely loyal to the government. It is the government's principal instrument to quell dissent and is believed to be behind several of the recent atrocities that have been committed against the Truscan population.

The ISB has been rumoured to attack innocent fellow Bongos and give the incident the trappings of an attack by Truscan insurgents. The motives are twofold: first, to whip up popular feelings of disgust and suspicion among Bongos for their Truscan neighbours; second, to give legitimacy throughout the international community when the Zefran government imposes harsh anti-terrorism measures against Truscans in Zefra.

Irregular Forces

There are a number of irregular forces operating within the territory of Zefra.

Zefra Association (ZA)

The ZA started as a government-sponsored Bongo nationalist militia. The ZA has been associated with atrocities committed on Truscans, and the Zefran government claims it has no control over the ZA in such matters. However some evidence has been emerging that there are still links to the Zefran government, and that those activities for which the government needs "plausible deniability" get assigned to the ZA.

There is recent evidence that the alleged head of the ZA and the head of ISB are actually half-brothers, and that both are cousins of the new President of Zefra. The President has been quick to point out that allegations of a family relationship between him and the head of the ZA are absolutely unfounded, that he actually has no power at all over the ZA, and that he has been using whatever influence he may have to clean up the ZA and direct it away from the evil ways of the past.

There were audits in December 2019 of spent-fuel waste from the ZEC's two nuclear sites that suggested a considerable amount of high-level waste (highly toxic radioactive material) was unaccounted for, as much as 140 kg. There were rumors at the time that rogue elements of the ZA, with the ISB security forces for the reactors looking the other way, had penetrated the nuclear sites and extracted nuclear waste stored in sealed and shielded containers. The waste in these containers would have amounted to 28 containers each holding 5 kg of waste in 50 kg of shielding. The IAEA expressed considerable concern at the time. However, some months later the reaction from government officials in China and in Zefra was that Chinese engineers had made a mistake at the time of the audits and that, in fact, they could now account for all of the high-level waste. The IAEA was never given any detailed account of the alleged disappearance and the subsequent investigation. However, stories have surfaced of highly radioactive material that could be available to terrorist groups for a price, and the contacts that have offered to arrange a potential sale are all from Bongo tribes in Zefra.

Internal Solidarity Movement (ISM)

The ISM claims to be a Bongo right-wing separatist movement, but it has developed into a drug-based criminal cartel. While it did indeed start life as a political movement, its perpetual need for financing of its activities led it into an early alliance with existing criminal cartels in Zefra. Initially the ISM leadership felt they would be able to dominate the criminal element due to the "purity" of their own ideals. But over time the attraction of easy money from drug smuggling came to dominate ISM decisions. The ISM has been implicated in a number of mass killings, but it remains unclear if these are politically motivated, or more like gang violence intended to support their criminal activities.

Peoples' Liberation Movement (PLM)/Peoples' Liberation Armed Militia(PLAM)

The PLM is a political movement for a Truscan opposition group seeking autonomy within Zefra. The PLAM is the armed component and the dominant opposition group in Zefra. Much of the leadership of the PLM retains considerable respect in Zefra and internationally for their intent to better the life of average Truscans. The PLAM on the other hand has frequently been linked to brutal attacks on Bongos throughout Zefra.

During the Zefran Civil War the PLM constituted a "government in waiting", hoping to replace the Bongo autocracy, and the PLAM leaders apparently took their orders from the political leadership of the PLM. But following the end of the civil war, the PLAM has become more independent of the PLM. It became a home for Truscans who wanted to take the fight to their Bongo neighbours, by any means available. In the last few years, with a number of bloody stains on its reputation, the PLAM has frequently been described as a rogue element.

People for a Greater Zefra (PGZ)/People's Force (PF)

The PGZ is a moderate, multi-ethnic party seeking an inclusive democratic Zefra. The PF is the armed wing of the PGZ. The PF is the most sophisticated armed group that exclusively targets government assets.

The Insurgency

Within Zefra, an insurgency has been brewing since the days of the Zefran Civil War. During the Civil War, various factions fought the central government in the role of an opposition party, a viable replacement for the Bongo-led autocracy. By the conclusion of the Civil War, with the autocracy left largely intact, the government's opponents became an insurgency the aim of which was to show that the Bongo-led autocracy could not govern Zefra except in a few selected areas, and then only with the most savage of methods. Indeed, a goal of the insurgency was to show that when the autocracy did govern, it was with a heavy hand, well supported by brutal security forces.

The Chinese-Zefran Connection

In 2015 China began to increase its investment in Zefra. While Zefra remained a relatively poor nation, its abundance of coal reserves near the south-eastern coast of Zefra attracted Chinese industries looking for raw materials.

As industrial relations between Zefra and China warmed, an informal military friendship developed in parallel. The Bongo leadership in Zefra was particularly attracted to Beijing's overtures as they came without the criticism of Zefran leaders commonly received from the US, Europe, and Australia. Talks with Western nations always included comments from those nations critical of the heavy authoritarian hand used by the Bongos against the Truscan majority in Zefra -- in particular, the US leadership sought more democratic rights for the people of Zefra. No such criticism came up during talks Zefran politicians had with leaders in Beijing however; indeed, Beijing seemed to appreciate that Bongo leadership in Zefra seemed more focused on stability than on democratic rights. Also the government of Zefran began to see a potential alliance with China as insurance against any future repeat of the US Marines landing in 2007, memories of which still remain an impediment to better relations with the West.

Port visits to Zefra by PLA Navy ships began in 2015 and have grown in importance to both nations. Also PLA transport aircraft became such frequent visitors to Zefran airbases, that a small but permanent Chinese presence was established in 2018 at two of the military airfields. These are PLAAF personnel who load and unload the visiting transport aircraft and provide support services including refueling and minor maintenance; they have no combat training. In the past, material carried by these transports have included replacement crew members for visiting PLAN ships, military exports from China to support Zefra's military forces, items required by Chinese troops who deploy to Zefra to use local training areas. There are now typically two or three air transport flights a week between Zefra and PLAAF bases in the Guangzhou Military Region of China. Also elements of PLA's 15th Airborne Corps have recently deployed to Zefra in company strength for out-of-area training about four times a year for one or two weeks at a time (there are none of these forces in Zefra at the current time). When required, these deployments have been supported by additional flights of the PLAAF's main tactical airlifter, the Xian Y-20 Ark.

Nuclear Plants and Ballistic Missiles

The Chinese State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (usually referred to as SNPTC) has had a cordial and productive arrangement with Zefra for nearly a decade. The main product of this arrangement has been the recent commissioning of two power generation sites in Zefra, each with two CAP1400 reactor units. For some time this was a trilateral arrangement that also involved two American players: Westinghouse and Oregon State University. Westinghouse provided design expertise and OSU provided support for testing and safety of the facilities.

The two American players hoped that their involvement might improve bilateral relations between the US and Zefra; however, both have since withdrawn from the project. They withdrew following an incident where staff who were visiting the construction sites in Zefra were captured and briefly held by insurgents; when the Zefran government said it would be unable to guarantee safety of such visitors in the future, Westinghouse and OSU reluctantly ceased their involvement.

When SNPTC first looked to Asian and South American nations for some export potential of its CAP1400 design for nuclear power generation, the only interested party was the Zefran Energy Corporation, ZEC. For China, development of nuclear power with ZEC had two obvious benefits. First, it would be a demonstration project to show success to other nations that might then partner with SNPTC in the future. Second, the power generated by plants in Zefra would ensure that Chinese industrial investments in Zefran coal would have guaranteed access to power, when the norm for the Zefran population was to have rolling blackouts that gave them electrical power for only a few hours each day.

Construction of a pair of CAP1400 nuclear power units were started at two different sites in Zefra in 2014. After the lives of American workers at these sites were threatened in a series of incidents in 2018, SNPTC's US partners, Westinghouse and Oregon State University pulled out of the CP1400 projects in Zefra. However, construction of the plants continued and they began providing power to the Zefran grid (such as it is) in late 2019.

Apart from providing power to the coal industry of Zefra, the electricity from the reactors is also a domestic resource of power. In particular, the availability of electricity from these plants has made the desalination plants in Zefra more productive since they are no longer subject to long periods of blackout. However, one touchy issue over the location of the reactors is that the national grid provides greater access to this power for Bongo communities than for Truscan communities.

Apparently China brokered a secret deal between Zefra and Pakistan in 2018 that resulted in the transfer to Zefra of components of M-11 missiles that had originally been shipped from China to Pakistan in 1993. (These M-11 missiles are mounted on a mobile launcher and are claimed to have a range of 250 km and payload of 450 kg; the M-11 is the export version of the DF-11 missile held by the PLA.) Given that the M-11 components had been in storage in Pakistan for over 20 years at the time of transfer to Zefra, it is not clear that all would be in working order. The Clinton administration of the 1990s imposed sanctions on China and Pakistan since their bilateral arrangement transferring the missile components from China to Pakistan violated US law associated with the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR], but these were lifted against China in 1994, when China reaffirmed its 1992 commitment to adhere to the MTCR. (The range/payload characteristics that China, Pakistan, and Zefra claim for these M-11 missiles are slightly under the MTCR Category I limits of 300 km and 500 kg, but have not been independently verified.)

US analysts have suggested that China might be substituting new replacement components from Chinese DF-11 missiles for failed components in the Pakistani M-11 missiles now held by Zefra. Such a subterfuge, if China's role were to be discovered, might permit China to claim it was not exporting missiles or missile technology to Zefra, but simply providing maintenance for missiles already in place. Fortunately there is no indication that any nuclear weapon technology has been exported to Zefra either by Pakistan or by China; so there is no threat that the M-11 missiles in Zefra have nuclear warheads.

Also, the CAP1400 reactor design will not produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. And processing waste for weapons-grade material would be uneconomical, and beyond Zefran technical resources in any case. However, the nuclear high-level waste from the reactors does contain highly toxic material that could be used in a dirty bomb or as a means to contaminate wide areas with nuclear radiation. The Zefran leaders have announced they have complete control over the nuclear waste from their reactors. These announcements followed complaints from Beijing in late 2019 that Chinese engineers could not account for some 140 kg of high-level nuclear waste during an audit conducted by SNPTC nuclear safety personnel. After a short period of intense bilateral discussions, both Chinese and Zefran government officials now claim that the original reports from the engineers were incorrect and all materials have since been accounted for; the IAEA has asked for reports on this incident, but neither China nor Zefra have provided them.

New Found Riches in Daloon

Following the discovery of offshore natural gas in Daloon territorial waters in 2011 things began to change once more. Southern European interests were especially quick to support Daloon’s development of this resource as a source for meeting their own rising energy demands. International investment and development activities significantly improved the Daloon economy. Meanwhile many Zefrans grew envious of the apparent developing prosperity of their southern neighbour.

In China's quest for new sources of energy supplies, these natural gas reserves of Daloon have not gone unnoticed. Chinese corporations have been buying shares in companies throughout the Daloon natural gas industry. Also many Chinese workers have moved to Daloon to provide trained personnel for the industry. They generally live in dense specially built housing in enclaves along the east coast, close to the gas fields.

Daloon's Security Forces

With its new found resources, the Daloon government soon launched a program to develop a modern armed force that would be more effective in the protection of its border region. Although it was offered large quantities of relatively unsophisticated equipment, the Daloon Government deliberately spurned these quick-fix deals from the arms industry. Instead it opted to develop its armed forces with limited quantities of state-of-the-art equipment, particularly in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), electronic warfare, communications and non-line of sight precision strike.

The Army’s first integrated unit reached initial operational capability (IOC) in 2013 and full operational capability (FOC) in 2014. The second integrated unit reached IOC in 2014. By 2016, there were three integrated units operating under a central command structure.

A small fleet of fast patrol boats was acquired for protecting Daloon territorial waters. These craft employ stealth technology, over-the-horizon radar and long-range missiles.

Daloon’s small Air Force has manned and unmanned components. The manned element is composed of a regiment of armed, rotary-wing utility aircraft. There are sufficient aircraft to move one integrated unit in two lifts. The Air Force’s unmanned aircraft are used primarily for ISTAR tasks in support of both the Army and the Navy. There are a limited number of strike platforms that are capable of supporting both the Army and the Navy with a variety of precision lethal and non-lethal payloads.

The Daloon Armed Forces includes a small special forces unit with integral air and naval resources. This elite force numbers no more than 500 troopers, apart from aircraft and boat crews and support personnel. The level of training is superb, the leadership and morale are excellent, and their equipment is sophisticated and well maintained. These special forces personnel are highly respected by the people of Daloon for their high professional standards and commitment to the nation.

That Daloon was able to develop a sophisticated, modern force in a relatively short period can be attributed to their acquisition and training concepts. Acquisition contracts required the suppliers to provide initial and continued operator training for Daloon military personnel, and an obligation to provide comprehensive maintenance was integrated into the purchase agreements.

Collective training and staff training were also contracted services, most of which has been provided by the TOKEN Counter-Threat Corporation, an international company based in Macau, with branch offices in Switzerland and Hawaii. TOKEN employees provided operational mentoring teams down to sub-unit level until the integrated units became fully operational. TOKEN continues to provide staff training and supports collective training throughout the armed forces.

There have been rumours that TOKEN staff have participated in military operations with the Daloon armed forces (going way beyond simply training the personnel). In particular the TOKEN staff working with the elite special forces seem to have been caught up in the enthusiasm often seen in such forces. In early 2020 the CEO of TOKEN acknowledged that such problems have come to light, but, he says, new control measures by the company have taken the issue in hand. However it appears that some TOKEN employees in Daloon and Zefra have not yet read the company memo on that.

TOKEN Counter-Threat Corporation

TOKEN is a private military corporation with a murky history, although the current management pledges that all their scandalous past is now behind them. TOKEN started by providing "security training" for its clients. In the early years TOKEN was based in southern Europe and recruited its employees largely from La Légion étrangère (French Foreign Legion). Business was good and, as TOKEN grew, it recruited from other nations, particularly from ex-military personnel with a special-forces background. Many of TOKEN's current clients are in southern Asia and the South Pacific region.

In view of its new focus in the South Pacific, the company headquarters was moved to Macau, and there are rumours that TOKEN may be providing the Chinese Red Army with information on western military tactics. This may be the reason that Macau authorities seem to have looked the other way when TOKEN employees have ended up in strange circumstances.

One of TOKEN's most lucrative contracts presently is with the Government of Daloon. TOKEN employees, many of whom are US ex-service personnel or former US intelligence operatives, are now embedded in most units of Daloon's armed forces, ostensibly as trainers. However, there are rumours that TOKEN employees have taken on operational roles from time to time, especially those working with the elite special forces of Daloon.

In addition to its training role with the Daloon military services, TOKEN employees have been contracted with many non-governmental organizations to provide security in high-threat environments. TOKEN has the contract to provide bodyguards for the Chinese workers in Daloon and perimeter security for the enclaves where they live.

Also there are many TOKEN employees known to be inside Zefra employed as bodyguards for western charities and for other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). The Zefran security services are highly suspicious of the TOKEN employees in their country -- they reason that information collected by TOKEN personnel in Zefra could easily be passed to the Daloon military through the TOKEN company links.

Since the alleged incident in late 2019 of 140 kg of missing high-level waste from the CAP1400 reactor sites in Zefra, TOKEN personnel have taken over security duties at the two locations. Its contract specifies that TOKEN will provide only facility security and have no role in operations, maintenance, nuclear safety, or auditing of waste products. Previously (and when the alleged incident took place), a special unit of the Zefra's Internal Security Bureau (ISB) was assigned responsibility for site security. (There have been suggestions that ISB may have colluded in the issue of the apparently missing waste products. Even if there was no such collusion, the ISB procedures were apparently so lax that just about anyone could have had access to the waste storage areas.) Soon after the Chinese on-site engineers claimed there were significant waste products that had gone missing, Beijing officials encouraged the Zefran leaders to replace ISB personnel at the sites with TOKEN personnel. The TOKEN head of security at the sites is a Chinese national sent out from TOKEN head office in Macau following the hand-off from the ISB to TOKEN in early 2020. At the time, Zefran authorities objected that authority for site security should remain theirs, but, as a bargaining point, China pointed out that ongoing operation of the sites still depended upon Chinese good will and the support provided by the Chinese engineers. ISB personnel reluctantly left the site in early 2020 during the hand-off to TOKEN.

Neonaxos and New Anatolia

Two small island nations to the north of Capricornia -- Neonaxos and New Anatolia -- have vested interests in a peaceful settling of issues in Zefra. In the late twentieth century both islands became popular tourist destinations. However any local conflict has a direct and severe impact on their economies as the tourists flock to other destinations when there is a threat of violence in vicinity of the Coral Sea. The Zefran Civil War (2002-9) was a period of economic hardship that lasted long afterwards due to the international economy (and tourist trade) being slow to recover from the recession of 2008-9.

Map of Geopolitical Context Neonaxos was settled in the early eighteenth century by ethnic Greeks (many from the island of Naxos) who wanted to leave behind the increasing violence in their homeland. Before the Greek war of independence (1821–1832) a diaspora to Neonaxos was seen as a peaceful means to establish an independent Greek homeland. Relatively little further Greece-to-Neonaxos immigration followed once the home nation had achieved its independence from the Ottoman Empire.

After many generations of intermarriage the population of Neonaxos largely considers itself to be Polynesian, although cultural links with Greece remain strong. The Greek Orthodox Church remains an important part of the culture of Neonaxos.

New Anatolia was settled by Turks and Arabs who originally landed there in the days of expansion of the Arab and Ottoman Empires (thirteenth century). As Islam spread into nearby Indonesia and Malaysia, Turks (and some Arabs) in a quest for new lands began to settle New Anatolia. The predominant religion is Islam.

Coincidentally settlers from Greece and Turkey ended up on two islands in the Coral Sea no more than 100 miles apart. Due to their cultural histories, many of the animosities of their respective homelands have complicated the geopolitical relationships between these two South Pacific island nations.

The governments of both Neonaxos and New Anatolia simply want the problems of Zefra to go away. Their economies have been starved of tourist dollars from the years of festering violence in Zefra. As a stopgap both are hoping that contracts to support the basing of international forces in the area may give a small but vital boost to their economies.

Violations of the UN Peace Agreement

The period of peace following the Zefran Civil War was all too short. By 2015, a more extremist central government was in control in Zefra and was prepared to violate the peace agreement by disbanding the autonomous region (established under UN auspices) and replacing it with three provinces. Almost immediately, the PLAM and other opposition groups began a protracted insurgency campaign against the Zefran central government. However, their overall effectiveness was hampered by in-fighting between the three dominant factions within the PLAM.

The Zefran government reacted with aggressive counter-insurgency action; but it failed to achieve a decisive victory. Meanwhile, the fighting had a tremendous humanitarian impact on the population in the Zefra. Large segments of the population fled to Daloon once again, and to the major urban areas in Zefra, to escape the violence that was rife throughout the countryside.

During this conflict, Daloon was much more capable of securing its border. However, insurgents from Zefra did occasionally manage to penetrate into Zefra while still based in safe havens inside Daloon territory.

Daloon’s forces decisively defeated an attempted cross-border pursuit of Truscan insurgents by Zefran forces into Daloon in the spring of 2016. In the aftermath of this attempted incursion by Zefran forces into Daloon, the Daloon government declared an area up to 10km on the Zefran side of their common border to be an exclusion zone for Zefran armed forces.

Daloon regularly monitors the exclusion zone and has enforced it on several occasions over the past few years. The so-called exclusion zone encompasses some of the major fresh water sources that supply both sides of the island. Daloon control over this essential resource has the potential to be a point of major friction between the two countries, particularly in periods of drought.

International pressure on the Zefran government did not have an appreciable affect on the humanitarian conditions; however, it did change the government's approach to prosecuting the conflict. In 2018, bowing to international pressure and facing the economic consequences of continuing to prosecute military operations, the Zefra government declared a cease-fire. In reality however, it continued to conduct its campaign, but by other means.

The Zefran government had been encouraging the formation of Bongo militia forces under the umbrella of the Zefra Association (ZA) in areas where opposition to the PLAM was strongest. The government began arming the ZA before the cease fire and used them to conduct proxy operations against the PLAM. The ZA was soon playing a major role in the fighting and was partly responsible for the ravages that the civilian population were forced to endure.

The arming of the ZA inflamed existing inter-communal conflicts and resulted in the deliberate killing of tens of thousands of non-combatants and a vast displacement of civilians. It also provoked a reaction from the PLAM against the ZA areas of support. Thousands of villagers were forced from their homes as a consequence of the fighting and the depredations of both the ZA and the PLAM. The fighting has continued to generate a flow of refugees from Zefra into Daloon, stressing the latter's capability to support this displaced population. Daloon remains concerned that Zefra’s internal strife might spill over into Daloon with the refugee flow.

Zefra Invades Daloon

In December 2019 the government of Zefra mounted an significant attack into Daloon. The international community saw this as a crass move by the Zefran president to unite his people, both Bongos and Truscans, in a universal cause against an alleged external threat: Daloon. The lack of evidence that Daloon was an aggressor seemed irrelevant to the Zefran government. The much more sophisticated armed forces of Daloon brought the invasion to a halt, but at considerable price in casualties, which the small army of Daloon could ill afford. The Daloon ground forces were unable to expel the Zefran forces entirely or to re-establish the international border. Small pockets of Zefran forces remain inside Daloon territory, up to 10 km south of the border.

Daloon appealed once more to the international community to assist it against the incursion and to deal with the internal Zefran issues that had led to the attempted invasion. In January 2020, the president of Zefra, having failed in his objective of seizing the resources of its southern neighbour and of unifying his nation to fight for a common purpose, stepped down and called for new presidential elections.

The newly elected president of Zefra (April 2020) has been far subtler than his predecessors in his policies. Currently he seems to welcome a foreign military presence in his country as a means of quelling the insurrection. His cooperation does come at a price. He demands that foreign military action should be seen as closely coordinated with the Zefran Armed Forces. This means, for example, that patrols must be conducted with equal-sized forces from the foreign powers and from Zefra.

International Conference for Zefra

An International Conference for Zefra (ICFZ) was convened in Rome in March 2020 under European leadership to address the continuing humanitarian crisis in Zefra. The United Nations provided legal authority with a Security Council resolution invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). A majority of Security Council permanent members supported the resolution, with China abstaining. China apparently had a side deal with the US that it would abstain as long as any coalition force did not include the US. The ICFZ sought to work with the government and people of Zefra and with the United Nations in a sustained effort to initiate civil discourse between the belligerents, to provide humanitarian assistance, to promote the rebuilding of democratic institutions, to assist in social and economic development, and to combat poverty.

The Conference agreed that the first step was to deploy a multinational force to establish a safe and secure environment. From this baseline, the components of the United Nations and other institutions would assist Zefrans to move towards a more attractive future. The conference participants pledged to assist in the development of a democratic political process, to support humanitarian and economic assistance, to promote the protection of human rights, and to initiate practices for a recommitment to the rule of law.

The Conference established an overarching objective to end the humanitarian crisis in Zefra, with a view to creating the conditions under which the Zefran people can govern themselves in a free, safe, secure, and inclusive society that values the primacy of human rights and the equality of all individuals under the law. The Conference established further sub-objectives:

  • The separation of all belligerents and neutralization of forces that are creating instability, perpetrating acts of inhumanity and generating the humanitarian catastrophe. The multinational force must establish at least local cessation of hostilities and security as a prerequisite for other relief and development operations to take place.
  • The humanitarian crisis is multidimensional, requiring integrated and complementary solutions combining immediate humanitarian intervention with a large-scale mid to long-term rehabilitation strategy. Agencies involved will include UNHCR, WFP and partners, WHO and partners, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNDP, and FAO. (See pp. 38 to 46 in The Army of Tomorrow Seminar War Game Handbook for details on these acronyms and others.)
  • The restoration of the rule of law in Zefra through the rehabilitation and restructuring of the police, judiciary and corrections system including individual accountability and command responsibility. It is necessary to refurbish, strengthen and restore legitimate national police and judicial services including internal and external oversight mechanisms. Law reform, judicial reform and accountability for past crimes will need independent agency input in coordination with UNDP.
  • Neutralization of combatants and improved security will set the stage for a coordinated global approach in which the diverse aspects of the crisis can be addressed with CIVPOL, OHCHR UNDP, UNIFEM, UNICEF and public information components.
  • The international community will insist on equitable political involvement for all segments of the population regardless of region, or ethnicity, will work toward constitutional change and creation of a nationally representative parliament, will assist in reform of the appointment of ranking civil servants, and will assist with conduct of elections together with UNDP.
  • The restoration of the country's productive capacity and livelihoods is essential to the long-term prospect for peace and to elevate the human condition in Zefra. Once a secure environment and the rule of law have been established, this will be led by the UNDP, FAO, World Bank and other international financial institutions (IFI) and development agencies – supported by international donor assistance. This will first require the government to interdict illicit drug activities, and to gain full and effective control over its territory.
  • The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including women, children and youth. The force will be assisted by CIVPOL and UNDP/DDR for disarmament, security and stabilization.
  • The future requirements for Zefra armed forces will be the decision of an elected government. Swift revitalization of the national police will reduce the need for an army as a security force. The multinational force will protect arms recovered from combatants pending the need to turn them over to legitimate security forces.
  • A reformed education system will be a prelude to long-term stability economic development, and cultural change. First priority will be given to access to primary education followed by economically-relevant secondary education. Agencies will include UNICEF, UNDP, and UNIFEM.

Desired End States

ICFZ operations will have met their objectives once a sufficiently secure environment has been established in which:

  • relief and development agencies can work safely in cooperation with a legitimate democratic government;
  • refugees, internally displaced persons and former combatants are being repatriated without fear of reprisals;
  • international standards of human rights are honoured by the government;
  • the humanitarian crisis has been resolved due to the coordinated efforts of the government, UN agencies and NGOs to provide aid; and
  • control of security can be handed over from the multinational force to legally reconstituted government security forces or a follow-on UN security force.

Coalition Forces

Australia has agreed to accept responsibility as the Lead Nation of the coalition forces (Combined Joint Task Force Zefra or CJTF Z). New Zealand agreed to provide the deputy commander of the military force, and significant resources for the components of CJTF Z. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain, Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands have agreed to provide military forces and civilian police forces. Small elements, generally civilian police, medical and logistics components (with no combat capability), have been offered by Singapore, Philippines, and India. France and Spain have agreed to provide other elements of national power, but because of previous involvements in the area neither of them will contribute ground forces. Both of these countries and Russia, which has also agreed to be a member of ICFZ, will limit provision of support to the strategic level. The United States will not provide combat forces to the coalition, but has offered selected resources for surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance (filtered as required for coalition consumption). The US has also offered to back-stop coalition forces should they run into significant problems. However, China has objected that such an offer violates the conditions of the China-US agreement at the Security Council that led to China abstaining rather than vetoing the UN initiative.

Daloon has indicated it may provide limited support if requested. However Daloon is very sensitive over its colonial past and the presence of foreign troops in the country is highly distasteful to most citizens. The Daloon government has, thus, restricted the number of foreign personnel they will allow inside Daloon and has also restricted foreign personnel to remain on their assigned bases except for transiting to Zefra to accomplish their military mission.

The Australian commander and New Zealander deputy commander of CJTF Z and their staff have developed Campaign Plan; see pp. 47 to 56 in The Army of Tomorrow Seminar War Game Handbook for details. There is an accompanying op order for land operations on pp. 57 to 64.

The coalition, represented by a deployed military force (CJTF Z), is largely under first-world leadership. The US gave this initiative its blessing, although with some doubts about its credibility in terms of military effectiveness. China acquiesced as long as US combat forces are not involved. The military leadership in CJTF Z believes it has a handle on the situation and is skeptical that any US military action would be to the long-term benefit of CJTF Z -- "those Americans just do not understand the nuances of this very complicated situation".

Hi-tech Concept Testing and Evaluation in the Coalition

Australia has had a number of innovative military concepts in development in recent years. The deployment to Zefra and Daloon seems to be a opportune time to test some of these on operations. Much of the underlying science and engineering for these systems was conducted by the Defence Science and Technology Group. The further development of the concepts and the manufacturing of practical systems for use by military personnel has be trough a public-private partnership with the Asia, Pacific, Australia, and New Zealand Company, APAANZco.

APAANZco has its headquarters and design staff in Auckland, with a subsidiary design staff in Sydney. For economy of scale and efficiency of manufacturing, many of the components of the systems used by the CJTF Zefra personnel were built mainly at facilities Guangdong Province of China.

Australia has a procedure to deploy scientific staff from the Defence Science and Technology Group as scientific liaison office to the leadership of expeditionary forces. And they have done so with CJTF Zefra.

In addition to DST Group personnel with the CJTF Zefra, APAANZco has contractor support deployed as well. The senior APAANZco representative is embedded with the staff of the coalition headquarters.

A Role for the United States

The US Government has announced it will support the international initiative, but will not contribute to the coalition ground forces deploying to the island of Capricornia. The nations in the region are all holding their breath to see what the United States will do next. The Combatant Commander of SAPCOM, headquartered in Guam, is contemplating the options.

The first term of the US President is coming to an end as 2020 is an election year in the United States. Some political pundits are starting to ask: "Will this also be the President's last term?" In recent months the President has shown little progress on many fronts. Internationally, Israel and the Palestinians see still at an impasse, the recent crop failures in Africa mean that the American public sees starving African faces every evening on the news, globalization (and associated US trade policy) is being blamed for recent economic woes, and China seems to dominate in South Asia and the South Pacific. Domestically, the jobless rate remains the highest it has been since late 1982 (10.8%), and the President has been promising new jobs since before the election of November 2016.

As the four-year term of the administration comes to a close, the President is concerned that reviews of its performance have been mixed, at best. The President strongly desires to be re-elected, feeling absolutely convinced about being the best leader the nation can have as it faces an uncertain and challenging future. However, many Americans are dubious about the leadership, and the opposition party is developing several powerful and attractive candidates who are showing well during the primaries that are in progress.

On the domestic side the economy is sluggish, especially when compared to continuing strong growth in the Chinese and Indian economies. The strong international performance of these and other nations of Asia have drawn attention to the President's foreign policy. Here the President seems especially vulnerable to political opponents. The current trade policy seems to have left the US economy subordinate to strong Asian economies. The administration's foreign and defense policies have rarely impressed the voters. The President's claims of being a strong and decisive leader on the international stage have seen many challenges: pundits say the President is really should be seen as "weak and indecisive", and lately American voters seem to be listening to this.

Throughout the current term, the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense have negotiated foreign interventions to be largely left to non-US coalitions; certainly, the US has managed to avoid leading these coalitions, and indeed it has generally been able to influence them from the side lines. The intervention in Libya in 2011 has been the paradigm to be followed more than Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2014). The President's objective has been to limit the risks to US military personnel, confident that voters will gauge the success (or failure) mainly in terms of the price paid in terms of lives of US service men and women. In the early days of the current term, this policy of being a cheerleader for non-US coalitions seemed like a winning strategy: the US could claim some moral leadership in these interventions, but at a modest price in both treasure and the blood of its service personnel. But lately such coalitions are looking more like excuses for inaction.

Since the withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan and the brief and unsuccessful 2004 intervention in Zefra, there has been little appetite among the American public for new foreign interventions. Indeed the landing of Marines in Zefra in 2004 to deal with the civil war is still frequently used as an example of the failures that can come from an ill-considered intervention that is under-resourced and puts American service personnel in the middle of a complex situation with no obvious winning strategy.

While still a candidate, the current President demanded that the previous administration should oblige other nations do more in the interests of international security (and have the US do less). This President has been consistent in pressing the other nations to clean up there own messes. But, in the current US political climate, the President's image could really benefit from some international breakthrough that could be claimed as a decisive personal victory.

With the troubles in Zefra, the President is weighing the options. There has been a lot of press coverage that the US leader is now looking like a leader who cannot get the job done. The American people were promised quick action to resolve the problems in Zefra, but then, on the ground, nothing seems to change.

To date, the most frequent White House response has been that "the coalition is in charge on the ground, and we support the coalition". But the Truscan and Daloonian immigrants (especially numerous in California and Florida -- key battleground states in the coming election) are demanding stronger US action; other American voices are starting to demand this too. The President's political advisors are very concerned about this development especially since these immigrant voters are particularly strong in key states for the coming election campaign. In fact, if the President could look particularly decisive over Zefra, and if a breakthrough could be accomplished "on the President's watch", this could be key to electoral victory in these states, and, as a consequence, nationally.

Status Report April 2020

The new president of Zefra claims a strong mandate to govern -- 87% of the vote in last month's election. But the election went largely unsupervised by the international community (the government of Zefra claimed they could not ensure the personal safety of the international observers, so there were none). Consequently, there are suspicions of massive fraud, but little proof. However the president claims to the "father of the people of Zefra", with his election results as the evidence.

He appears prepared to use every available means to embarrass the US government, US forces in the area, and any other organization affiliated with the US. The president feels a righteous indignation that foreigners have come to Zefra to solve problems that should been left to the people of Zefra, under their chosen leader (of course!). The president will cooperate with CJTF Z in many respects. The president, and his backers, see the international funding coming into Zefra with CJTF Z as a source of cash to their allied tribes and clans. However, the president feels that CJTF Z is a temporary phenomenon and that Zefrans will have to find a suitable long-term resolution of their own.

The Government of Daloon has suffered for years from the instability in Zefra and frequent threats from its government. Its recent prosperity has given Daloon resources to build a small but highly capable military force. In this it has benefited from a commercial alliance with the TOKEN Counter-Threat Corporation. TOKEN employees are embedded in most military units of Daloon. TOKEN employees are also present in Zefra where the company has contracts to provide bodyguards and site security for many of the international agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, and humanitarian efforts.

There is an alphabet soup of Non-Governmental Organizations operating in both Daloon and Zefra: UNHCR, WFP, OXFAM, FAO, UNICEF, MSF. Two of the oddest are Clowns Without Borders and Jesters for Social Responsibility. These two organizations -- bitter rivals for news coverage and the subsequent cash donations that follow -- claim they raise the happiness quotient in the most direct way: they make people laugh!

China is a key player in the region, if staying aloof from the coalition operation in Zefra. China has industrial and commercial links with both Zefra (coal mining and nuclear plants) and Daloon (off-shore natural gas). The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has a small ongoing presence at two airbases in Zefra, and occasional larger deployments into training areas in Zefra. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has a task force in the general area that has been making local port visits. China has strong objections to a US combat role in or near Zefra and thought it had a bilateral agreement with the US that US combat forces would not be involved -- however, the US has pointed out that this applied to no US ground forces within the coalition contingent, and was not intended to apply to any US-only activity. China is now suspicious that the US will use any coalition failure as an excuse to deploy unilaterally.

The international media are watching closely. Some agencies have embedded reporters with military units. The New Straits Times (based in Singapore), who's owners seem to have a commercial connection with TOKEN, have reporters with Daloon military units, including the Special Forces. Their reporters are also active in Zefra, especially with the humanitarian organizations.

Other countries in the region have their own interests in various possible outcomes. These countries include New Anatolia and Neonaxos (as small players). Also interested are Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the Philippines; these are closely aligned with the US, but have unique concerns about developments so close to home -- and are troubled that the US and the Europeans do not grasp many of the local issues and their relationship with the troubles in Zefra.

The New Zefran President

The new Zefran President claims he has the support of his people and that he wishes to bring peace to the nation, soon to be followed by prosperity for all. He has announced that there is a spirit of cooperation with the international forces that are arriving in the region to help. Of course, he emphasizes, this assistance should be consistent with the traditions of Zefra, where the president is the "father of the people". He has also demanded that the foreigners do only what needs to be done to deal with the insurrection, and then leave immediately; anything less would be an affront to the national sovereignty of Zefra.

The President has offered that foreign military forces can patrol in Zefra in strength up to platoon level, as long as they are accompanied by Zefran forces of the same size. He claims this is to ensure that locals are not spooked by having foreign troops operate in their proximity, with the Zefran troops readily available to translate, to negotiate, and to smooth over issues that may seem culturally alien to the foreign troops.

The President pointed out that the Chinese government has offered to provide PLA military forces to guard the two nuclear reactor sites that were co-developed by the Chinese State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) and Zefran Energy Corporation (ZEC). Site security is currently provided by TOKEN Counter-Threat Corporation (with no more than small arms capability), but if TOKEN personnel came under any sort of military threat, the Chinese military could intervene if necessary. China has proposed that elements from the PLA Marine Corps are attached to the PLAN "South Pacific" Task Force currently training in the Coral Sea and conducting port visits; these forces could be landed in Zefra in a matter of hours to secure the nuclear sites. If a more persistent military force were required, elements of the PLAAF's 15th Airborne Corps might be deployed. The Chinese proposals are still under consideration by the Zefran leadership.

Although the new Zefran President claims to be a "nice guy" -- without the bloody reputation of his ruthless predecessor -- he may have ties to some of the more nefarious Bongo organizations in his nation. The ISB is ostensibly a wing of his government (albeit widely viewed as a rogue element) and rumors persist of its involvement in recent reprisals against Truscans. The ZA continues to take actions that strengthen the President's base of power with his fellow Bongos, e.g., intimidating Truscans with brutal and bloody attacks, providing (fabricated?) evidence to Bongos that they should suspect that their Truscan neighbors are supporters of violence and mayhem. Since a link between the government and the ZA has never been conclusively proven, the president and his government retain "plausible deniability" over the ZA's actions. Even actions that can be traced to the ISB can, if necessary, be attributed to a bunch of "hot heads" who are not under government control.

The new president's apparent accommodating attitude towards foreign troops has struck many Westerners as suspicious. Is this a cunning ploy to get Western forces enmeshed in operations in Zefra where there are often promises that things will get better, but always 'not today, but tomorrow'? Is his offer of coordinated patrolling a means for the Zefran military to have advanced warning of where coalition forces may be planning some new operation?

Combined Joint Task Force Zefra -- CJTF Z

Under a United Nations mandate (and Security Council Resolution 9000) a coalition force has deployed to the South Pacific to assist in resolving the many issues between Zefra and Daloon and within Zefra itself. While not part of this force, the US has offered support in more strategic areas.

The Australian commander of CJTF Z and his New Zealander deputy are confident that this force can make a real different and provide succor to people of Zefra. However, they are aware that this could be a time consuming process, and have chafed under US pressure to show results, and soon!

The US President

As election season approaches in the US, the President and the political advisors are planning their re-election campaign. The major foreign policy story is the troubles in Zefra. The President's political advisors are saying that the best solution would be if the problem could just go away, and quickly. There are substantial voting factions in California and Florida (key battleground states) who immigrated from Zefra and Daloon over the decades; they would look very favourably on a President who solved some of the serious problems in their homelands... but time is short for this.

The President wants the coalition force to be successful, but is impatient to see results -- and there have none so far! Through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the President recently tasked the Commander and staff of SAPCOM to develop plans for a US amphibious landing in Zefra to provide support to the coalition. This could be a "game changer" in Zefra (and potentially with American voters come election time). But, if this landing were to be costly in US casualties or were to get the US bogged down in some long-term commitment in Zefra, it could play very badly in the upcoming election.

South Asia and Pacific Command (SAPCOM)

In 2016 the massive expanse of US Pacific Command (PACOM) was split roughly along the equator and the southern border of China. PACOM has kept its name and, with a reduced geographical area, it can now concentrate on China, North Korea, and eastern Russia -- substantial challenges, without question.

One of President Obama's goals from early 2012 was that DoD "will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region..." Splitting PACOM into two geographic combatant commands was an obvious way to allocate more defense resources to this region. While the physical resources have not doubled, creating two geographic combatant commands has expanded the staff resources that can tackle more problems developing in the Asia-Pacific region. With SAPCOM headquarters established in Guam, its approaches can be seen as more sensitive to local issues of South Asia and the South Pacific (Honolulu is a long way away!).

SAPCOM still has a huge area of responsibility in its own right. And nations in the area create substantial problems: India and Pakistan, Burma and its neighbors, and, of course Zefra and Daloon. While China is not within the SAPCOM boundaries, China has been a major player in South Pacific issues for well over a decade, often leaving US foreign policy in tatters. Fortunately the US has valuable allies in the region, particularly Australia and New Zealand.

However, with the recent difficulties on the island of Capricornia, the SAPCOM commander has come under considerable pressure from Washington. First, the commander and staff have looked in public like they were surprised by recent events. Widely read US papers have been asking: "Why did SAPCOM not see this coming? Why are they not doing something? How long will it take to sort out what should be a minor problem in a tiny nation?" Some bolder papers have been asking questions like "Should the SAPCOM commander be replaced with someone more assertive, and more sensitive to South Pacific issues? Can't the Pentagon find someone more willing to take a leadership role in this critical part of the globe?"

Second, some political advisors to the President have pointed out that relieving the current SAPCOM commander could play out nicely in the Washington press: the President would look decisive, but not have to commit US troops to the operation. So far, the President has rejected this advice and announced his complete confidence in the US military leadership, both in the Pentagon and at SAPCOM. But the President and his political advisors are certainly growing impatient to see some results in Zefra.

The International Community

The international community is keenly interested is how the situation in Zefra will unfold. France and Spain are former colonial rulers of Zefra and Daloon respectively and continue to have strong ties, including ongoing commercial interests. China has avoided a direct role so far, but has naval units in the South Pacific conducting reciprocal visits and friendly port calls and also has small groups of PLA Air Force personnel at two airbases in Zefra. Chinese business interests have been investing in the coal fields and new nuclear reactor sites in Zefra and in the new natural gas discoveries in Daloon, and there are several enclaves for Chinese employees of those companies that are active in both countries.

Non-Governmental Organizations

International aid and humanitarian organizations have been active in the area for some time and are operating on both sides of the border. Agencies in Daloon have been assisting Daloon authorities in dealing with the refugee situation. The focus of agencies operating in Zefra has been internally displaced persons. Their operations have been hampered by the continuing violence by the ZA and the PLAM and a general lack of support from Zefra government authorities.


The government and the people of Daloon are growing frustrated with their northern neighbor. The refugee camps are overflowing. Criminal elements from Zefra are affecting the peaceful way of life. The economy is in a nose dive. Unwelcome foreign military forces (from the coalition) are using the nation as a base for operations in Zefra. Something must be done. And soon!

The Media

US Media: The New York Times, CNN, Fox News

The media in the US are generally supportive of Western intervention in Zefra. However many questions have been raised over whether the White House policies are influenced more by the upcoming US elections than by a honest desire to improve the situation for average Zefrans. Many journalists are also pressing the US leadership over the effectiveness (or its lack) by the coalition forces: should the US step in when the coalition (CJTF Zefra) seems to be getting bogged down? This issue re-emerges every time the coalition appears to be at an impasse, or where it seeks compromises instead of confrontation, or when the coalition leadership makes a move that goes down poorly with the American public.

International Media: BBC, The Times of London of London, Seven News and Nine News in Australia, and Al Jazeera

The media from many coalition members support Western intervention. Press in Australia and New Zealand have been strong supporters of the coalition and see the South Pacific leadership as a means of re-asserting Australia and New Zealand as senior players in regional politics.

Al Jazeera in particular has been critical of the "White Man"-led intervention. Al Jazeera points out that there is a high percentage of Muslims in Zefra and they would be more comfortable with outside intervention if it were under the umbrella of, say, the Arab League. The Muslims of Zefra may well see the intervention as yet another Christian crusade meant to subjugate Muslims. Even an intervention led by ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) could remove the stigma of the intervention appearing to be the neo-colonial powers of the white race dealing with unruly natives. Al Jazeera has also pointed out that the issue of governing Zefra may be more related to superpower politics, with Zefra a pawn in the regional interplay between the US and China.

Press Releases

  • No press releases for the time being.

Maps and Charts

  • Geopolitical Context Map of Geographic Factors Map of the Geopolitical Context
    • Zefra and Daloon share the island home called Capricornia.
    • The locations of Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Neonaxos, and New Anatolia are shown relative to Zefra and Daloon.
    • International airline routes crisscross Zefra and Daloon -- Beijing to Auckland, Seoul to Wellington, Honolulu to Sydney.
    • Most commercial shipping traffic crossing the Coral Sea passes along the coastlines of Zefra and Daloon.
  • Important Geographical Factors Map of Geographical Factors
    • Two reactor sites (each with two CAP1400 reactor units) have been built in Zefra with Chinese support. They have been providing electrical power to the national grid for about a year.
    • Kabra (location of a battalion from the Republican Guard) is just north of the border with Daloon (red circle).
    • Many refugee are located inside Daloon. There are five large camps with populations of over 25,000 each.
    • Daloon has established a military exclusion zone extending 10km into Zefra and roughly parallel to the border.
    • New sources of water have been found in the highlands area near the eastern end of the Zefra-Daloon border. Much of this area lies within the military exclusion zone.
    • Desalination plants are critical resources in both Zefra and Daloon. In Zefra much of the energy to run the desalination plants are provided from the two nuclear reactor sites.
    • There are two natural gas fields offshore of eastern Daloon. Exploration continues with the promise of several more commercially viable gas fields.
    • Personnel of the PLA Air Force are stationed at two airbases in Zefra. These Chinese PLAAF personnel are to support airlift operations, e.g., aircraft maintainers, fork lift operators. They are not combat troops.
    • The Presidant of Daloon is prepared to have shipping that supports the UN mission use the Port of Whyglaa on the east coast of Daloon close to the border with Zefra. They must share dock space with cruise ship operations.
    • UN aircraft can use two airfields in Daloon. The Daloon Ministry of Aviation requires 4-hour prior notification of each arrival and departure. The airfields are at Whyglaa and Yeebud. Both have limited firefighting support, and only for 16 hours each day.
  • Whyglaa lies on the east coast of Daloon, just south of the border with Zefra. It has a seaport and an airport. The President of Daloon has offered to make both the seaport and airport available for support to the UN mission, but with conditions. The Port of Whyglaa is also used by cruise ships and the UN shipping should avoid conflicts with cruise ship operations.
  • There is a second airport further south at Yeebud that is available for UN operations. It is much smaller than the airport at Whyglaa.
  • Area for Potential US Amphibious Landing If a US amphibious landing were to be executed, the most likely location would be on the southeast coast of Zefra, near Shoalwater Bay. See arrow.
  • Area around the town of Kabra
    • A battalion of the Republican Guard is known to be in the area west of Kabra.
    • Most of the battalion is deployed in the hills to the north and south of the Capricorn Highway (A4) west of Kabra.
    • This battalion, known as the "Illustrious Fighters for Freedom" is expected to engage combat forces from the UN-backed coalition (CJTF Z).

CJTF Zefra, US, and Chinese Orders of Battle

Combined Joint Task Force Zefra (CJTF Z)

CJTF Z will be led by an Australian Commander with a New Zealander Deputy.

Confirmed troop contributing nations (TCN) are the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, and Norway. Singapore, Canada, and Norway have provided police officers for a civilian police component. Other like-minded nations may contribute forces at a future date.

Combined Joint Task Force Zefra:

Commander: Lieutenant General Andrew H. Harrowsmith, AO, Australian Army

Deputy Commander: Major General James Parata, DSD, New Zealand Army

• International military staff, under a Canadian Chief of Staff.

• Signals Battalion (Aus)

• Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC), under a Dutch colonel

• Multinational CivPol (civilian police) command (MCPC) with 60 police officers from Singapore, Canada, and Norway under Singaporean command

Land Component:

Austalia – Land Component Commander (LCC)

• Aus: Headquarters UN Multinational Brigade, based on 1st Brigade

• Aus: Battle Group, based on 1st Armoured Regiment A and C Squadrons (ASLAV vehicles) with infantry attachments from the brigade

• Aus: Brigade troops including a helicopter squadron, artillery battalion, and a composite logistic support batallion

• NZ: Battle Group, based on Queen Alexandra's Mounted Rifles (QAMR) with infantry attachments (NZLAV vehicles)

• The Netherlands: Battle Group based on an operational marine battalion (MARNSBAT1), logistics support based on the amphibious logistical battalion (AMFLOGBAT)

• Norway: Field hospital and attachments, based on the Sanitetsbataljonen - a Role 3 medical facility, thanks to augmentation of additional civilian medical staff

• Canada: Battle Group based on 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (LAV III vehicles)

• Germany: One Role 2 medical facility

• Australia/New Zealand: Additional brigade troops including a reconnaissance squadron (ASLAV), engineer squadron, and transportation company

Air Component:

UK: Air Component Commander

• Aus/NZ: Six F/A-18 aircraft; six MRH90 multi-role helicopters; two C-17 aircraft

• Canada: Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), six CF-18 aircraft; four C-130J aircraft; three UAVs; two CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft (MPA)

• UK: 6 medium lift helicopters (CH-47) Chinook; air traffic control; air and airfield defence

• The Netherlands – Two CH-47D/F Chinook helicopters from 298 Squadron, RNLAF

Maritime Component:

Aus: Maritime Component Commander (MCC);

• Aus/NZ: HMAS Canberra (LHD, "L02")

• Aus/NZ:Two frigates ( HMAS Ballarat "FFH 155" and HMNZS Te Kaha "F77"

• Aus/NZ: two Boeing P-8 Poseidon long-range patrol aircraft (LPA)

• Aus/NZ: HMNZS Canterbury "L421" - logistics support ship

Aus/NZ: HMAS Rankin "SSG 78" - guided missile submarine

• Canada – two frigates HMCS Vancouver (FFH 331) and HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) and two Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels

• The Netherlands – HNLMS Karel Doorman "A833", joint logistics support ship

Special Operating Forces Component

Aus/NZ: Special Operations Forces Component Commander (SOFCC)

• Aus: one composite squadron from Special Operations Command (SOCOMD), called "Roo Squadron" - 65 personnel

• NZ: one composite squadron from New Zealand Special Air Service NZSAS, called "Kiwi Squadron" - 65 personnel

• The Netherlands: composite unit drawn from Korps Commandotroepen called "Task Force Orange" or "Oranje" - approx. 60 personnel

• UK: one composite squadron from 22 SAS Regiment, called "Lion Squadron"

• Canada: a composite Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) drawn from Joint Task Force 2 and the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, called "Task Force Arrowhead"


Each TCN has been requested to be prepared to consider requests for additional forces should the need arise. Specific forces have not been earmarked and the deployment time is estimated at 30 days.

US Forces

The Commander of US SAPCOM created CTF 171 to be prepared to support US operations in the Coral Sea related to parallel coalition operations in Zefra. The carrier strike group component, CTG 171.12, is operating northeast of the line from Guam to New Zealand and is not to enter the Coral Sea without specific orders from National Command Authorities (Washington) so it will not enflame the situation unless directed by higher.

Other components of CTF 171 may be operating closer to Zefra and Daloon as Commander SAPCOM sees fit. Commander SAPCOM has retained command of CTF 171.

Anticipating a need for humanitarian assistance on the island of Capricornia and the adjacent waters, an international response group has been formed from US, Australian, and Chilean resources. This is CTG 179.1. The tri-national agreement between the US, Australia, and Chile allows OPCON by SAPCOM on condition that the force is used purely for humanitarian assistance to civilians.

Forces under COMMAND or under OPCON to SAPCOM are:

CTF 171

CTG 171.12 (Carrier Strike Group)

• CVN × 1 (Nimitz class)

• CG × 1 (Ticonderoga class)

• DDG × 3 (Arleigh Burke class)

• T-AOE × 1 (Supply class fast combat support ship)

• Carrier Air Wing × 1

CTG 171.13 (ISR Support Group)

• UAV × 4 (Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton based at Andersen AFB, Guam) (currently tasked to provide one on station at all times)

• VP × 4 (Boeing P-8 Poseidon based at Andersen AFB, Guam) (currently tasked to provide one on station at all times)

CTG 171.14 (Submarine Support)

• SSN × 2 (Virginia class Block III)

CTG 171.16 (Expeditionary Strike Group)

• LHD × 1 (Wasp class)

• LPD × 1 (San Antonio class)

• LSD × 1 (Harper's Ferry class)

• CG × 1 (Ticonderoga class)

• DDG × 1 (Arleigh Burke class)

• LCS × 4 (Independence class littoral combat ship, with Northrop Grumman MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV)

• T-AKE × 1 (Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ship)

CTG 171.17 (Marine Landing Force)

• MEU × 1

CTG 171.18 (Logistics Surface Support Group)

• T-AKE × 2 (Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ship))

CTG 179.1 (Humanitarian Response Group)

CTU 179.1.1 Detachment 2 from 349th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron - Travis AFB, California

• C-130J × 2 from 349th AES, forward deployed to RAAF Williamtown, NSW, Australia

• Medical personnel from Det 2 are TDY to RAAF Williamtown, NSW, Australia

• Det 2 will use RAAF Williamtown near Newcastle, NSW, Australia as a forward operating base.

CTU 179.1.2 USNS Mercy T-AH-19 (Homeport: San Diego, activated for potential Zefran relief mission)

CTU 179.1.3 Cirujano Videla PMD-74 (From Chilean Navy, will cooperate through SAPCOM for humanitarian operations)

• Both vessels are currently alongside HMAS Kuttabul (Sydney Harbour), and require four-days notice to sail.

Civilian hospitals in Sydney/Newcastle will accept civilian evacutees up to 240 beds.

Chinese PLA Forces

The Chinese Task Force "South Pacific" was created to provide a Chinese presence in South Pacific areas outside of the South China Sea. It is not intended for combat operations so may be unbalanced for a specific combat mission. It consists of the following units:

• FF × 4 (Type 054A, with one Ka-28 helicopter on each)

• DD × 2 (Type 52C, with one Chinese Hummingbird V-750N UAV on each)

• DD × 2 (Type 52C, with one KA-28 helicopter on each)

• LSM × 2 (Type 074, each with 250 PLA Marines and support equipment, there are no combat vehicles or no heavy weapons larger than 100mm mortars)

• 1 × AOR (Qiandaohu-class or Type 903 replenishment ship, NATO codename: Fuchi, with 1 × Ka-28 helicopter and 1 × Chinese Hummingbird V-750N UAV)

• 1 × Type 920 Hospital Ship 866 Daishan Dao (English: Peace Arc) -- Not part of Task Force "South Pacific" but can deploy from Ngong Shuen Chau Naval Base (near Hong Kong), approximately 10 days sail away from Capricornia.

The Chinese Hummingbird V-750N is a rotary-wing UAV that has been adapted to be launched and recovered from a ship's helo deck. Mission duration is typically 6 hours, with transit speed of 100 knots and loiter speed of 60 knots. On board sensors may include electro-optics and radar (50 n.mi. range)). It can be armed with missiles.

No submarines are assigned to this task force, but may be operating in the Coral Sea under command from the Chinese mainland.

A strategic-level UAV (similar to the MQ-4C Triton) may be operating in the area, launched and controlled from mainland China.

The Zefra Scenario

Potential Problems for SAPCOM

  • Can CJTF Z deal effectively with its challenges or should the US prepare to step in?
  • Should CJTF Z include US liaison officers from SAPCOM?
  • How much latitude will China permit before it makes a move? How should SAPCOM forces react if Chinese naval, air force, or airborne forces intervene? Would the Chinese pass intelligence information to Zefran forces about US deployments or operations near the Zefran coast?
  • What will be the impact of the failed US landings in Zefra from early in the Civil War?
  • Should SAPCOM include staff positions for CJTF Z officers?
  • Is there a role for US amphibious forces, say for a landing on the southeast coast of Zefra?
  • How strong is the rogue battalion known as the "Illustrious Fighters for Freedom" or IFF that are in the vicinity of the town of Kabra? Will this force engage CJTF Z? What will be the outcome and the impact on the UN mission?
  • What should SAPCOM do if Zefra were to use chem-bio weapons on its own civilians? How could it confirm such use?
  • How should SAPCOM treat NGO personnel who are in Zefra on humanitarian missions? What about personnel from TOKEN, a private security contractor?
  • SAPCOM has a humanitarian response group in the area (CTG 179.1). Should this resource be provided to assist with assistance to civilians? Are there restrictions on employment? If there are threats to personnel in the response group (Americans and others too), what should be done?

Reaction in the region to SAPCOM moves

  • How will Zefra react to SAPCOM initiatives? Will the world see such moves as consistent with the Security Council resolution, or purely for US self-interest?
  • What about the Chinese naval presence near Zefra? Will Chinese vessels stand by if a US amphibious force threatens a landing in Zefra?
  • Will NGOs welcome a greater US involvement in Zefra, or elsewhere in the region?
  • Will Australia or New Zealand be prepared to extend basing rights connected with operations in or near Zefra?

The UN-Backed Coalition Force - Combined Joint Task Force Zefra

  • Will the Zefran president back up his words of welcome for UN intervention, or will the president work maliciously to undermine the UN-mandated mission?
  • Can informal links with SAPCOM be exploited to support the UN mission, or will China object to US assistance (without the commitment of combat troops)?
  • Is the threat from the rogue battalion known as the "Illustrious Fighters for Freedom" or IFF real? Will this result in combat operations for components of CJTF Z?
  • The Australian and New Zealand components of CJTF Z include a number of prototype systems developed from concepts that originated with the Defence Science and Technology Group. To what degree can military operations be adjusted to accelerate the testing and evaluation of these innovations?
  • The company that built the prototype equipment, APAANZco, has deployed contrator support for the products. How will the number of these contractors on the battlefield affect military operations?
  • Can cordial relations be maintained with non-military organizations like the Non-Governmental Organizations, e.g., Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and the TOKEN Corporation employees?

The view from Beijing

  • How much intervention by the US is too much? China abstained at the UN Security Council when the mandate for the coalition force (CJTF Z) was agreed, but only if the US did not contribute to that force. But if US forces take action to support that coalition force, would that violate the US-China side agreement, at least in spirit? If so, what exactly should China do?
  • There is a PLA Navy Task Force in the vicinity of the Coral Sea. What direction should be given to it? How should it deal with Zefra, with CJTF Z (the coalition force), with US forces?
  • What should be done if Chinese nationals in civilian roles in Zefra or in Daloon are threated? Should China leave their protection to the coalition? Would this be acceptable to the people of China? Can or should China work with US forces to ensure the safety of any Chinese nationals who are under threat?
  • Is Beijing confident that the nuclear reactor sites in Zefra are still safe? If nuclear waste is really missing, what should China do?

The Chinese Naval Task Force "South Pacific"

  • Can the Commander of the PLAN Task Force play a role? Should the US ships be shadowed?
  • If there is ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) information on US actions, should this be passed to Beijing? How aggressively can Chinese resources gather ISR information on US actions? Should this information be passed to friends in the Zefran government or military?
  • Is there anything that can be done to ensure the safety of the Chinese civilians working in Daloon? What about those in Zefra? If the coalition or Zefra or Daloon fail to protect Chinese lives, should Chinese military forces be landed?
  • Should an offer be made that Chinese Marines could be landed in Zefra to increase the security around the nuclear reactors to ensure waste products are not stolen (and used in dirty bombs)? Should these Marines also beef up security at the two airfields that have PLAAF personnel on them?
  • The PLAN has a hospital ship at the navy base near Hong Kong? Can it be sailed to the vicinity of Capricornia to be available for humanitarian relief?

US Basing Options

  • The US will not seek bases in Daloon, for fear of inflaming the situation and potentially weakening the international support for CJTF Z. So where else can bases be found?
  • Neonaxos and New Anatolia (island nations to the north) are rivals of each other, and both would benefit from an economic boost from an influx of US resources. But then they might look like stooges of "Uncle Sam". Are there ways to provide some basing support, without yielding too much national pride? How will expansion of US bases into Neonaxos or New Anatolia play in Beijing?
  • What about the limited basing rights that Neonaxos or New Anatolia have already offered the naval and air forces of the Red Army?

Protection of Civilians

  • The Security Council resolution indicates that protection of civilians should be of the highest priority. How can SAPCOM support this?
  • Should the protection of civilians extend to TOKEN personnel?
  • What about the NGO "Clowns Without Borders"? And what about their rival "Jesters for Social Responsibility"? Can they be taken seriously?
  • What about the criminal gangs operating off the Zefran coast and within the country? Would "protection of civilians" extend to them, if they were attacked by some Zefran forces?

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons -- Weapons of Mass Distruction

  • Civilian medical teams from NGOs have reported a mystery epidemic in the IDP camps in Zefra. Could this be evidence of use of a biological WMD by the Government of Zefra?
  • What about the missing (alleged, but not proven) 140 kg of high-level nuclear waste from the reactors in Zefra? Is this just a story to raise the stakes? Could the Zefran military or some rogue forces possess some form of "dirty bomb"? Could such a device be combined with the M-11 tactical ballistic missles to contaminate beaches of Zefra or offshore areas?
  • If some radical faction actually has some or all of the missing nuclear waste, would they use it to contaminate there own tribal lands and claim it came from outsiders (e.g., CJTF Z?, the US?, Daloon?)? This could become a trumped-up justification for one faction to start atrocities against a target faction, after falsely accusing them of nuclear terrorism to justify the attacks.

Elections for a New Zefran President

  • In the recent election, there was a single candidate from the Bongo minority (the current president), but three from the Truscan majority. There are rumours that Bongo money was supporting all three of the Truscan candidates -- a effort to split the Truscan vote. Apart from that there were no international observers and many stories of how Bongos had intimidated Truscans who came to the voting stations. Should CJTF Z (or SAPCOM) step in, say to implement new (and fairer?) elections. Or, would this be viewed as unacceptable interference with a seemingly legitimate democratic process?